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Abstract— Nowadays, physical health of equipment 
controlled by Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) is a significant 
concern. This paper reports a work, in which, a hardware is 
placed between Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) and the 
actuator as a solution. The proposed hardware operates in two 
conditions, i.e. passive and active. Operation of the proposed 
solution is based on the repetitive operational profile of the 
actuators. The normal operational profile of the actuator is fed 
to the protective hardware and is considered as the normal 
operating condition. In the normal operating condition, the 
middleware operates in its passive mode and simply monitors 
electronic signals passing between PLC and Actuator. In case 
of any malicious operation, the proposed hardware operates in 
its active mode and both slowly stops the actuator and sends an 
alert to SCADA server initiating execution of the actuator’s 
emergency profile. Thus, the proposed hardware gains control 
over the actuator and prevents any physical damage on the 
operating devices. Two sample experiments are reported in 
which, results of implementing the proposed solution are 
reported and assessed. Results show that once the PLC sends 
incorrect data to actuator, the proposed hardware detects it as 
an anomaly. Therefore, it does not allow the PLC to send 
incorrect and unauthorized data pattern to its actuator. 
Significance of the paper is in introducing a solution to prevent 
destruction of physical devices apart from source or purpose of 
the encountered anomaly and apart from CPS functionality or 
PLC model and operation. 
Keywords— Cyber-Physical System Security; IoT Security; 
Physical Threats in IoT; Physical damage control 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Cyber Physical System (CPS) includes two main parts: 
cybernetic system and physical system. The CPS 
requirements and its structure makes it challenging to make it 
secured. Security challenges related to CPS include:  
1) Device constraints such as energy, memory and 
computing resources, and device type. 
2) The software deficiencies such as embedded 
heterogeneous applications, operating systems, diversity of 
CPSs in their security requirements and sensitivity ratio. 
3) The network deficiencies such as node mobility, 
scalability, real-time operation and dynamic linkage. 
Complicated relation between cybernetic system and 
physical system is also an important challenge. From security 
point of view, physical systems are often at risk from their 
cybernetic vulnerabilities. This is due to the growing 
interaction between physical and cyber systems in CPSs. 
Due to the expansion of CPSs and their usage in sensitive 
areas such as medical systems, water, gas and power grid 
networks, intelligent transport systems and smart homes the 
operational safety of CPSs is important. 
For example, Stuxnet is one of the most complex threats 
introduced during the recent years. The final goal of the 
Stuxnet is to reprogram Industrial Control Systems (ICS) by 
modifying codes stored on the PLCs, hide the attacker as a 
legitimate entity within the system and to interact with the 
system components. In addition, in the Stuxnet case, data 
mainstream from controller to actuators was changing, 
without being detected. Moreover, Stuxnet targets hardware 
components such as PLCs and Distributed Control Systems 
(DCSs) [1].  
This paper presents a protection method against self-
destruction apart from special functionality of the CPS. Once 
under attack, the proposed method prevents any 
inappropriate changes in controller parameters and sensor 
values. Therefore, terminating its destructive operation, it 
maintains system within a secure state of operation. Goal of 
the proposed method is to prevent CPSs from harming itself. 
Increasing device lifetime is not an intention for the proposed 
method. 
Intrusion detection systems are divided to misuse 
(signature-based) detection systems and anomaly 
(behaviouroral-based) detection systems. In anomaly 
detection approach, normal system behaviour is defined first, 
and then all other behaviours considered as abnormal [2]. 
The proposed solution applies predefined constraints on 
the data stream to protect the actuator and its subsystems 
from destruction. The proposed system is a prevention 
system as well as a response system, it prevents the defected 
PLC to send data to the actuator. It has an anomaly and 
specification-based functionality. 
In this work, a middleware is introduced between PLC 
and actuators, i.e. physical devices. First, a pattern is 
introduced as a working envelope using the controller 
parameters, authorized values and other sensitives for each 
device, i.e. normal behaviour pattern. The system 
administrator saves the normal behaviour pattern on the 
middleware at the initialization stage. Later, the secured 
working envelope is used as a basis to analyse safety of the 
CPS operation, during which, the CPS is monitored 
continuously. If an unauthorized value is recognized, the 
solution will immediately send an alert to the associated 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. 
For example, at normal operating condition, the 
middleware traces transmission of the signals between PLC 
and actuators in a passive manner; it analyses signals send to 
the PLC in accordance to a predefined secured working 
envelope. Whenever an unauthorized value is received, the 
middleware is activated automatically. Once activated, it 
slowly stops the actuator to prevent damage caused by a 
sudden stop. It sends alerts to the SCADA system and the 
SCADA system executes the emergency profile.  
Thus, the proposed solution monitors and prevents not 
only external and internal attacks but also inappropriate 
functionality derived from unintentional and insider wrong 
doings that target physical devices directly or indirectly. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Related works in cyber physical systems security, clarify 
that, the most of research follow the same common security 
solutions as in traditional IT networks [3]. Some of them 
engage in using authentication methods, access control, key 
management and encryption algorithms [4]. They propose an 
optimized solution for CPSs considering memory and 
computational resource constraints. In fact, they focus on 
requirements, processing time constraint and new diverse 
attacks on CPSs [5]. A category of them focuses on 
information flow [6] and routing protocols [7]. They 
optimize current protocols and propose solutions to improve 
the operation considering dynamic nodes and scalability in 
CPSs. Among all the researches in CPSs security field, the 
most of them present CPSs security challenges and 
requirements [8, 9]. They propose security models and 
frameworks referring to CPS attacks and vulnerabilities that 
are currently recognized [10, 11]. A majority of these works 
propose a method to CPSs attack detection using double 
closed-loop security control structure [12] or design an 
anomaly detection approach based on zone partition for the 
Industrial CPSs [13]. Hu et al. [14], propose a detection 
technique against stealthy attacks that can keep themselves 
undetected by following the expected behaviour of the 
system closely. Some consider a coding method for the 
sensor outputs to detect stealthy false data injection attacks 
[15]. Wang et al. [16], report a First Difference Aware 
Machine Learning (FDML) classifier to detect Time 
Synchronization attack (TS attack). Although these security 
solutions are necessary to design CPS's security framework, 
a new protective security solution is also required. 
Constraints, challenges and high accessibility in CPSs are 
important issues in this area. 
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD 
The proposed solution tries to provide a secure operating 
condition for physical devices in CPSs. The secured system 
stays within the safe operating condition even if an attack 
occurs and authentication methods fail or IDSs and other 
security tools are bypassed. Thus, high accessibility, 
confidentiality and graceful degradation in CPSs will 
improve. 
The idea behind this approach is to protect the physical 
device against shocks caused by rapid change in momentum 
(impulse) of the equipment. This is how one can damage 
shafts, gears or gearboxes. In general, cyber-physical 
systems are designed to withstand exerted force within their 
operating condition. Their lifetime is negatively affected if 
they operate slightly out of their designated boundary. 
Significantly distancing from the designated operating 
condition and they can be damaged (broken). The proposed 
approach intends to protect cyber-physical systems against 
this time of vulnerability. In another example, asynchrony in 
operation of different actuators in a conveyer belt will cause 
malfunction or may even damage the system.  
Protecting the system, individual actuator must be 
monitored and protected. Stopping one actuator may affect 
other parts of the system. Inevitability other parts of the 
system must shutdown once there is a malfunction in one 
part. This is why SCADA has to be informed and a central 
system has to monitor the middleware to correlate alerts and 
responses. 
The speed of operation in middleware is an important 
issue. However, in many industrial systems, the required 
response time is easily achievable using the currently 
commercially available hardware. This is why this is not of 
much concern in the reported work. 
As it is depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the middleware 
is located between PLC and actuator. Usually PLC is 
programmed (or reprogrammed) to control the actuator 
operations. During the start-up process, actuator's control 
parameters are initialized in the middleware by the system 
administrator. In the normal operating condition, the 
middleware acts as a transparent device. Whenever the PLC 
sends data towards the actuator, the middleware receives 
electronic signals from PLC and sends them towards 
actuator. Here the middleware acts as a repeater and passes 
PLC generated signals to the actuator. 
The middleware analyses signals generated by the PLC. 
Monitoring the controller parameters, the middleware is 
activated whenever it recognizes an anomaly. Initially, the 
middleware stops the actuator slowly and then, it sends an 
alert to SCADA system. SCADA runs emergency profile for 
actuators. Because of this operating condition, the PLC is 
tagged as a defected PLC. Furthermore, the PLC is left out 
from the working cycle until its error is corrected and the 
PLC is recovered. 
Initially, the administrator defines the emergency profile 
related to each actuator operating in a safe operating 
condition. In addition, in the proposed experiment, the 
middleware treats PLC and actuator as black boxes. 
Therefore, the architecture and functionality of the proposed 
approach is not dependent on the functionality or 
implementation of the various CPSs in use. Generally, it 
analyses and monitors the sensitive system parameters within 
the system. Hence, the proposed experiments are designed 
free from CPSs functionalities and models. Since the Fault 
Detection and Response System (FDRS) is monitoring and 
applying corrections to the inputs to the actuators, its job is a 
repetitive task. Considering industrial production lines 
carrying-out repetitive jobs, middleware needs minimum 
configuration and knowledge of its subsystems. As 
mentioned earlier, system may need a shutdown if a fault is 
detected in any of its subsystems. This does not need the 
controller to hold any knowledge about the system.  
 
Fig. 1. Proposed solution structure. 
Anomaly can occur by either intentional or unintentional 
reasons such as: 
1) Internal or external attacks that either directly or 
indirectly target physical devices for destruction. 
2) Bug or error in programming code within the PLC. 
3) Device failure or elapsed lifetime 
4) Unpredictable conditions 
This paper presents an experiment to examine proposed 
solution in voltage variant cases. 
A. Incompatible Voltage varient experiment I 
The goal of this experiment is to evaluate the proposed 
solution during an incompatible voltage variation. Let the 
PLC generate sequences of numbers as voltage values with 
disordered distances (random numbers or predefined 
numbers). The generated numbers such as motor revolute 
speeds (per minutes) are sent to the actuator. In addition, 
there are two controller parameters: Tolerable threshold (Tt) 
and Critical threshold (Ct). As the generated numbers could 
be equal to or greater than the Tt only for n times within a 
Sampling Time Window (STW). In fact, n is a sensitivity 
factor for the fault detection that shows how many times 
passing the threshold can be tolerated before a fault is 
announced. Minimum number within the sequence is Start 
(S) and maximum number is End (E). E and S are set to 
specify minimum and maximum acceptable numbers. 
In this experiment, Tt and Ct numbers are configured on 
the middleware prior to starting the experiment. During the 
normal operating conditions, the PLC generates numbers 
within acceptable boundaries and sends them towards the 
actuator. The middleware, like a repeater, passively monitors 
the transmitted numbers. The middleware generates numbers 
meeting one of the following cases once any internal or 
external attacks on the PLC or any bug and/or error codes in 
PLC programming is detected: 
1) Generated number is equal to or more than the Tt for 
n samples within a single STW. 
2) Generated number is equal to or more than the Ct for 
n samples within a STW. 
In these conditions (Figure 3), the middleware will not 
send the unacceptable number generated by the PLC towards 
the actuator. Instead, it sends an alert to the SCADA and 
SCADA runs the emergency profile related to the actuator. 
Therefore, the proposed system prevents attacker from 
destructing and damaging the hardware. Table I presents the 
first case as an example. 
Categorization of different boundaries of values within 
the sequence of numbers used in the experiment is presented 
in Figure 4. Generated numbers fall into three categories. 
Numbers smaller than the Tt are considered as authorized 
numbers. Numbers within the [Tt Ct) boundary are 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed solution structure. 
 
Fig. 3. Program flow chart. 
categorized as tolerable threshold. Numbers equal to and 
greater than the Ct are in critical threshold (must be avoided). 
Let, normally 5 numbers are sent from PLC towards 
actuator in a STW (each STW is about 20ms apart in the 
experiment). Therefore, as in (1), the first STW includes 
following five numbers from the set of generated numbers:  
 STW1 = 11, 15, 19, 12, 32 (1) 
The first STW does not meet any conditions. Because, 
the collected samples in STW1 are not equal to or more than 
the critical threshold. In this experiment, it is assumed that 
n=3 and it is acceptable to visit three numbers equal to or 
more than the tolerable threshold in every STW. There is 
only one number, i.e. 32, in STW1 that is more than the 
tolerable threshold. Therefore, the STW1 samples are 
acceptable and are transferred from the middleware to 
actuator.  
As presented in (2), the second STW (STW2) does not 
meet any fault conditions. 
 STW2 = 28, 30, 16, 13, 25 (2) 
Because, the collected samples in STW2 are not equal to 
or more than the critical threshold. There is only one number, 
i.e. 30, in STW2 that equals to the tolerable threshold. 
Whereas, it is assumed that n=3 in the experiment. Thus, 
it is acceptable to visit three numbers equal to or more than 
the tolerable threshold in every STW. Therefore, the STW2 
samples are acceptable. Hence, these samples are transmitted 
from the middleware to the actuator.  
In the third STW (STW3), as in (3), the second condition 
is not met since the collected samples in STW3 are not equal 
to or more than the critical threshold. 
 STW3 = 10, 31, 17, 30, 34 (3) 
However, there are three samples, i.e. 31, 30, 34, in 
STW3 that are equal to or more than the tolerable threshold. 
In the experiment, it is assumed that n=3, therefore, any 
recurrences less than three occurrences will be within 
tolerable threshold of any STW. Thus, the first condition is 
met in (3) and the middleware is activated as soon as 34 is 
generated in the STW3 by the PLC. 
Initially, the middleware stops the motor slowly (or holds 
its speed) and then it sends an alert to the SCADA. Later, 
SCADA runs emergency profile for actuators. In this 
operating condition, the PLC is tagged as a defected PLC. In 
fact, no numbers are received from the PLC for the analysis 
and transmission to actuator. Furthermore, the PLC is left out 
from the working cycle until error correction and PLC 
recovery is carried-out.  
In the fourth STW (STW4), as in (4), the PLC generates 
the number 40. 
 STW4 = 22, 18, 36, 40, 23 (4) 
Although the number 40 is more than the critical 
threshold, and agrees with the second condition, but no 
samples in the STW4 is considered. Due to the condition 
occurred in STW3, the PLC is tagged as a defected PLC. In 
addition, the PLC is left out from the working cycle until 
PLC operation is corrected. 
B. Incompatible Voltage varient experiment II 
Examining the second case, the third and the fourth STW 
samples are replaced with one another. Reported results in 
Table II are derived from the second experiment. 
The collected samples in the first and the second STWs 
are like STW1 and STW2 in the first experiment as in (5) and 
(6).  
 STW1 = 11, 15, 19, 12, 32 (5) 
 STW2 = 28, 30, 16, 13, 25 (6) 
In the third STW (STW3), as in (7), as soon as the PLC 
generates the value 40, the middleware analyses this number 
before sending it towards the actuator. Since 40 is more than 
the critical threshold, the middleware will be activated. 
Therefore, the middleware starts with stopping the motor 
slowly and sending an alert to the SCADA. Consequently, 
SCADA runs the emergency profile for the actuators. In this 
condition, the PLC is tagged as a defected PLC.  
 STW3 = 22, 18, 36, 40, 23 (7) 
Furthermore, the PLC is left out from the working cycle 
until error correction and PLC recovery is performed. As in 
TABLE II.  SECOND EXPERIMENT PRIMITIVE DATA 
Parameter Value(s) 
S 10 
E 65 
Tt 30 
Ct 38 
n 3 
STW 20 
Generated numbers 
11, 15, 19, 12, 32, 28, 30, 16, 13, 25, 22, 
18, 36, 40, 23, 10, 31, 17, 30, 34 
TABLE I.  FIRST EXPERIMENT PRIMITIVE DATA 
Parameter Value(s) 
S 10 
E 65 
Tt 30 
Ct 38 
n 3 
STW 20 
Generated numbers 11, 15, 19, 12, 32, 28, 30, 16, 13, 25, 10, 31, 17, 30, 34, 22, 18, 36, 40, 23 
 
Fig. 4. Categorization of the values within the sequence of 
possible to generate numbers. 
(7), it is necessary to note that 36 is an acceptable number. 
Although this number is more than the tolerable 
threshold, it can be ignored since it is the first occurrence of 
this condition in the STW.  
When the PLC generates number 34 in the fourth STW 
(STW4), as in (8). This indicates that the first condition is 
met, and an alert can be generated. 
 STW4 = 10, 31, 17, 30, 34 (8) 
The alert generation condition is met since there are three 
numbers equal to or more than the tolerable threshold in 
STW4. However, the PLC is tagged as a defected PLC 
because of the anomaly occurred in STW3. Thus, no numbers 
in the STW4 can be considered. 
As shown in the experiment, the middleware recognizes 
any incompatible changes in voltage value. 
In these experiments, anomalous pattern is used to 
generate out of range values. For example, following patterns 
can be considered: 
1) Operations outside of working envelope. 
2) Irregular and unauthorized number of occurrences of 
authorized behaviours 
3) Unacceptable duration of the commanding signals. 
It is imperative to place the middleware on a dedicated 
network isolated from the PLCs networks or subnets. The 
proposed functionality for the middleware is close to an 
Intrusion Detection and Response Systems (IDRS) and its 
architecture is again very similar, i.e. hierarchical 
architecture. A dedicated secure network can be responsible 
for the communication between them. In this way, a group of 
middleware can act as a team controlled by a central 
command that can find possible correlations between their 
activities considering information received from them.   
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
The experimental results in the simulated operation 
conditions successfully followed our expectations. 
Schematic for experimental setup is presented in Figure 
5. In this paper, Arduino [17] MEGA R3-2560 [18] 
generates the input numbers, as the controller's output data. 
In other words, it is considered as a Simulated PLC (SPLC). 
In addition, Arduino Leonardo [18] plays role of the 
proposed middleware. Therefore, the middleware monitors 
the controller's output data. This decision was because 
Arduino is commonly used as an easily available and 
affordable price board. Moreover, complexity of the 
controller's processing is such that Arduino is a suitable 
choice. For future works, the use of PLC instead of Arduino 
is considered. 
Resistive ladder is used to convert digital values to their 
analogue equivalents. In the real-world this part is replaced 
by a Digital-to-Analog Convertor (ADC). 
V. RESULTS 
The reported experiments show that once the working 
envelope for the PLCs are defined, the middleware considers 
them as the acceptance criteria for output data sent from the 
PLCs to the actuators. Whenever any incompatible data is 
received, the middleware acts as a barrier and prevents the 
incompatible data to be transmitted to the actuators. This 
low-level prevention approach eliminates any concerns and 
further need for tracking events looking for risks at the 
physical devices level. In this way, the risk of damaging 
physical devices can be reduced or even eliminated. 
In this experiment, there is a noise problem in converting 
analogue signals to their digital equivalents. An error rate of 
1 or 2 errors per 20 transmissions occurs in the repetitive 
experimentation. The experiment considers 6 bits as signal 
outputs. In another set of experiments, choosing larger step 
size and increase in the signal-to-noise ratio, the error rate 
 
Fig. 5. Schematic for experimental setup. 
can be greatly reduced or eliminated. 
In the reported experiments, an Arduino Leonardo is used 
as a middleware. The added middleware may increase the 
total response time. However, output signals this delay might 
be negligible for low rate changes in the Arduino.   
The main goal of the reported work is to prevent any 
destructive attacks on physical devices in CPS to guarantee 
business continuation. The middleware can be designed as a 
hardcoded device. In this approach, the middleware device 
can be implemented with PROM or EPROM replacing the 
RAM. As mentioned earlier, as a great advantage for this 
approach is its independency from CPS’s functionality, PLC 
Model and their operations. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In the experiments, it is shown that the proposed solution 
can prevent destructive attacks on physical devices. The 
solution is an FDRS and responses to an attack once the 
attack is detected. In other words, using the proposed 
approach, the middleware slowly stops the actuator to 
prevent damage due to a sudden stop and sends an alert to 
the SCADA system. Consequently, SCADA executes the 
emergency profile and leaves out the defected PLC from the 
working cycle and most probably with shutdown the system. 
The proposed solution has some drawbacks such as 
additional cost and delay since it uses a middleware. In 
comparison to PLC’s CPU cycle time, the response time in 
the proposed solution is short enough to affect actuators 
functionality. Hence, the system delay (that is due to the 
middleware) is negligible. Therefore, cost of the proposed 
solution is mainly the pricewise cost of the added 
middleware. 
VII. FUTURE WORKS 
In future work, the proposed solution will be examined in 
cases where frequency of the digital pulse is changing. In this 
approach, conditions where speed of the targeted stepper 
motors change will be monitored. 
In the proposed solution, the key point is the data 
transition rate between middleware and actuators. Especially, 
during an attack, in which, sending timely response is of 
great importance. For future work, it is proposed to use 
boards such as FPGA to design the middleware, which, can 
reduce middleware delay. 
In this paper, designing add-on hardware was proposed. 
However, designing add-on software could be a proposal for 
the future works. 
In the reported work, the presented experiment (Figure 1 
and Figure 2), a dedicated middleware is considered for each 
PLC. However, as for future work, it is possible to plan a 
common middleware to monitor the multiple PLCs. The 
middleware hardware should be fast enough to handle all the 
PLCs in its subnet within an acceptable time window. 
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